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  I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several years, the People’s Republic of China, under the lead-
ership of President Xi Jinping, has launched two interrelated campaigns which 
pose a novel problem for the international legal system. The first of these 
campaigns is an ambitious endeavor aimed at increasing China’s influence 
internationally.1 The second is a domestic effort aimed at stifling dissent and 
cementing the governing Chinese Communist Party’s control over its citi-
zenry.2 In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereafter Xinjiang), 
these two campaigns intersect in such a way as to pose a new and weighty 
problem for the international system of human rights, namely, how can the 
international system respond when a nation undertakes to forcibly destroy a 
minority culture without resorting to forced migration or mass murder? 
Xinjiang is China’s northwest-most region and is home to the Uyghurs 
(also spelled Uighurs), an ethnically Turkic people who practice Islam and are 
culturally, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from China’s Han majority.3 
The Communist government has made the elimination of Uyghur culture, and 
its replacement with an iteration of Han-Chinese culture more in line with the 
Party’s sensibilities, part of its domestic agenda for the region.4 This effort at 
sinicizing the Uyghur people makes use of an expanding system of reeduca-
tion camps accompanied by an extremely sophisticated and nigh-omniscient 
surveillance apparatus.5 Estimates vary as to how many people have been sent 
into these camps, but they range from several hundred thousand to over a mil-
lion.6 This campaign includes numerous violations of both Chinese domestic 
law and international agreements to which China is a party. 
 
 1 Is China Challenging the United States for Global Leadership?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 1, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/china/2017/04/01/is-china-challenging-the-united-stat 
es-for-global-leadership. 
 2 See Tom Phillips, Chairman Xi Crushes Dissent but Poor Believe he’s Making China 
Great, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017/oct/14/ 
xi-jinping-crushes-dissent-but-making-china-great-again. 
 3 Matthew Moneyhon, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”, 3 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 120-122 (2002); Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, Silencing the 
Silk Road: China’s Language Policy in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, 11 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L. J. 135, 138-39 (2009). 
 4   Ann Scott Tyson, Xinjiang: Beijing’s Chilling Attempt to Erase and Replace Uyghur 
Identity, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-
Pacific/2019/0107/Xinjiang-Beijing-s-chilling-attempt-to-erase-and-replace-Uyghur-iden 
tity. 
 5 China Has Turned Xinjiang Into a Police State Like No Other, THE ECONOMIST (May 
31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-int 
o-a-police-state-like-no-other [hereinafter Like No Other]. 
 6 Editorial, China’s Repugnant Campaign to Destroy a Minority People, WASH. POST 
(May 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-repugnant-campaign-t 
o-destroy-a-minority-people/2018/05/20/9fe061b4-5ac0-11e8-b656a5f8c2a9295d_story.h 
tml. 
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This Note aims to analyze the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang 
in the context of international law as it applies to China. It proceeds in three 
parts. Part I introduces the relevant historic background. Part II will discuss 
relevant facts, including the historical context of the campaign, the various 
cultural-political interests at play in Xinjiang, and the process by which the 
Chinese government suppresses the Uyghur people. Part III will begin by dis-
cussing two of the international agreements violated by the Chinese govern-
ment’s campaign against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and end with an examina-
tion of key Chinese laws.  Part IV will first examine the Chinese government’s 
failure to meet its obligations under the aforementioned international agree-
ments then examine the extent to which China’s domestic laws contribute to 
the present situation in Xinjiang. This Note concludes that the People’s Re-
public of China is in violation of its treaty obligations and that the Chinese 
legal system has not only allowed, but enabled, these violations. 
II. CHINA’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UYGHURS IN CONTEXT 
The Xi Administration’s campaign against the Uyghurs takes place against 
a complicated backdrop of historic and socio-political tensions. Historically, 
Northwest China, and Xinjiang in particular, is a very different place from 
China’s political power centers along its East Coast, and Han Chinese itera-
tions of nationalism predate even Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution.7 The 
situation is complicated by the fact that Xinjiang has been made into the 
world’s largest police state.8 This part of the Note first provides the necessary 
historical background to the situation in Xinjiang. It will then explore the var-
ious cultural and political interests at play. After the necessary context is pro-
vided, this part will discuss the campaign itself. 
 
A. History of Xinjiang: Before, Under, and After Mao 
 
Xinjiang has a long, complicated relationship with the Chinese interior,9 
and the Communist Party has made incorporating Chinese national identity in 
more isolated regions like Xinjiang a priority.10 Understanding the current 
plight of the Uyghurs requires some understanding of this history and how the 
relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government has developed 
over time. More specifically, a historical understanding requires an 
 
 7 Rian Thum, The Uyghurs in Modern China, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ASIAN HISTORY (Apr. 26, 2018), http://asianhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9 
780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-160; Like No Other, supra note 5. 
 8 See Like No Other, supra note 5. 
 9 Thum, supra note 7. 
 10 Moneyhon, supra note 3, at 131. 
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appreciation of Xinjiang’s history prior to the Communist Revolution, under 
Mao, and in the Post-Mao Era. 
 
i. Xinjiang from the Early to Mid-Twentieth Century 
 
The history of Xinjiang prior to Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution is 
complicated, and to this date there are still disagreements of fact between Uy-
ghur historians and the Chinese government.11 What is Xinjiang today has, at 
various times, been ruled by larger Chinese states, divided into smaller states, 
ruled as an independent region, and partially unified as a series of independent 
republics under various names, most notably the First East Turkestan Repub-
lic.12 This tumultuous history of varying different governments, revolution, 
and outside influence is largely reflected in the social tensions rife in Xinjiang 
today. 
At the start of the twentieth century, Xinjiang was a part of the Qing Em-
pire, which was, at the time, still struggling to integrate the region with the 
rest of China.13 Due to a combination of factors, including the efforts to inte-
grate Xinjiang with the rest of China and the emergent Uyghur nationalism 
movements toward regional autonomy, the collapse of the Qing Empire did 
not change the political makeup of the region; former Qing officials stepped 
in to rule the region even as the Qing Empire disintegrated into a number of 
successor states.14 In the following decades, various entities competed for 
power and influence in Xinjiang including the Soviet Union, outside Muslim 
armies, the Chinese Nationalist government, and Uyghur nationalists who 
sought to unite various Turkic groups in the region under a unified Uyghur 
identity.15 This competition resulted in a chaotic period which saw the crea-
tion of two different East Turkistan Republics, multiple Soviet interventions, 
and a rise in Uyghur nationalist sentiment.16 In spite of the chaos, the Chinese 
Communist Party emerged victorious when the portions of the region con-
trolled by the Nationalists surrendered to Communist forces bloodlessly, and 
the last vestiges of the East Turkestan Republic agreed to be absorbed into the 
People’s Republic of China.17 
 
 
 
 
 11 Elena Caprioni, Daily Encounters Between Hans and Uyghurs in Xinjiang: Siniciza-
tion, Integration, or Segregation?, 84 PAC. AFF. 267, 268 (2011). 
 12 Thum, supra note 7. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
   16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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ii. Xinjiang Under Mao 
 
Mao declared the birth of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, 
and his approach to Xinjiang initially involved a relatively light touch.18 A 
migration program  brought many Han Chinese into the region.19 The Islamic 
Court system was disassembled,20 and the new Communist government seized 
and redistributed land.21 Although these would normally be considered mas-
sive reforms, when compared with Mao’s subsequent programs, these policies 
were mild. 
Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist Campaigns, both of which 
began in the late 1950s, brought sweeping change to Xinjiang, with disastrous 
consequences.22 Forced collectivization ravaged the Chinese farm economy 
and radically reshaped socioeconomic institutions, all while new settlers and 
refugees resettled in the region.23 The Communist government began stifling 
religious practice early on, but it was during these campaigns that such perse-
cutions and likely related unrest began to affect Xinjiang. 24 Communist offi-
cials shuttered Islamic schools, took mosques to serve as their offices, and 
destroyed religious texts.25 Forced social reforms upended the social structure 
in Xinjiang to such an extent that public religious expression was nearly im-
possible.26 Simultaneously, the Anti-Rightist Campaign purged over one 
thousand Uyghur officials.27 Han Chinese Communists were placed in posi-
tions of authority, and the local economy and regional security forces were 
placed under their control.28 During the Cultural Revolution, Han Com-
munists took control of every aspect of life in Xinjiang. They dismantled Uy-
ghur social institutions, took control of the local economy, and established a 
firm grip on power in the region.29 Even though many Uyghurs, likely fueled 
by religious grievances, pushed back against Mao’s policies,30 the great 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Michael Dillon, Muslim Communities in Contemporary China: The Resurgence of 
Islam After the Cultural Revolution, 5 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 70, 82 (1994). 
 20 Thum, supra note 7. 
 21 Dillon, supra note 19, at 82. 
 22 Thum, supra note 7. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Yitzhak Shichor, Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism 
and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang, 32 ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AM. REV. 119, 
127 (2005). 
 25 Thum, supra note 7. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Dillon, supra note 19, at 82. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Shichor, supra note 24, at 127. 
2019] SILENCING XINJIANG 239 
campaigns of the Mao era were largely successful in repressing Uyghur reli-
gious and cultural practices.31 
 
iii. Xinjiang from Deng to Xi 
 
The post-Mao era in Xinjiang saw a resurgence of Uyghur nationalism as 
well as the emergence of a new problem in the region: Islamic extremism. 
Deng Xiaoping took power after Mao’s death, and his efforts toward a more 
open China were reflected in Xinjiang where there was a rapid restoration of 
Uyghur cultural identity.32 However, in the face of concerns about renewing 
Uyghur nationalist movements, reformist policies were quickly abandoned.33 
These nationalists were motivated in part by Beijing’s continued push to en-
courage Han immigration to Xinjiang which Uyghur nationalists perceived as 
a strategy to dilute local culture and ensure Han control of the region.34 Ten-
sions continued to mount after once-peaceful protests became violent.35 As-
similationist policies fueled rising Islamic radicalism which took root in the 
region and elevated tensions even further.36 Thousands of Uyghurs, now al-
lowed to freely travel to Mecca for the Hajj, returned with fundamentalist lit-
erature and videocassettes.37 Several Uyghur nationalist groups, labelled ter-
rorists by the Chinese government, incorporated Islamic fundamentalism into 
their messages.38 One group even called for a holy war against the Han and 
their perceived backers in Beijing.39 
Though few Uyghurs have taken the radical steps called for by some of the 
most extreme groups in Xinjiang, terrorism has nevertheless become a defin-
ing issue in the Xi administration’s approach to Xinjiang. Riots struck Xin-
jiang’s capital, Urumqi, in 2009 and left nearly 200 dead and over 1,000 in-
jured.40 Outbursts of violence have plagued the region, leading the Xi 
administration to wage what China’s state media has called its own “war on 
terror” against the perceived Uyghur threat.41 As this note will show, the 
 
   31 Thum, supra note 7. 
 32 Id. 
   33 See  Dillon, supra note 19, at 83. 
 34 Id. at 84. 
 35 Thum, supra note 7. 
 36 Shichor, supra note 24, at 122; Dana Carver Boehm, China’s Failed War on Terror: 
Fanning the Flames of Uighur Separatist Violence, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC 
L. 61, 83-84 (2009). 
 37 Shichor, supra note 24, at 122. 
 38 Id. at 122-23. 
 39 Id. at 123. 
 40 Reza Hasmath, What Explains the Rise of Majority-Minority Tensions and Conflict in 
Xinjiang?, 38 CENTRAL ASIAN SURV. 46, 46 (2018). 
 41 Phillip Wen, Terror Threats Transform China’s Uighur Heartland into Security State, 
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-security-ins 
240 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:233 
government’s actions in this “war” have significant implications in interna-
tional law and beyond. 
 
B. Tensions: Cultural and Political Interests at Play in Xinjiang 
 
The two primary actors in Xinjiang’s present situation are the region’s Uy-
ghur population and the Chinese government. The Communist Party’s policy 
toward Xinjiang centers on an effort to sinicize the region and the Uyghurs 
who live there and, in doing so, bring them more into line with the Communist 
Party’s vision of a more unified China.42 This policy has been in place for 
some time, and has led to an exacerbation of tension in the region,43 culminat-
ing in the campaign against the Uyghurs in place today. Uyghur interests have 
clashed with the government’s agenda. Under President Xi, the government 
has used this clash, and the conflicts therein to justify its actions in Xinjiang. 
Understanding the campaign itself requires one to examine both Uyghur in-
terests in the region and the government’s agenda, as well as the Xi Admin-
istration’s underlying justification for the campaign. 
 
i. Uyghur Interests in Xinjiang 
 
While Xinjiang is the traditional homeland of the Uyghur people, prior to 
the last century, few in Xinjiang would have identified with the term “Uy-
ghur.”44 In fact, Uyghur identity is a relatively new cultural phenomenon, one 
that began only in the early twentieth century.45 During this time period, many 
Uyghur writers and politicians began to explore their Islamic heritage as well 
as a shared, ethnonational sense of self, and Uyghur identity spread from 
there.46 This identity was shaped by two key components: Islam and Uyghur 
autonomy. 
Like most Turkic peoples, almost all Uyghurs practice Islam.47 For much 
of Uyghur history, Islam has been a part of daily life and has shaped Uyghur 
culture.48 By contrast, the Communist Party remains a staunchly atheistic 
 
ight/terror-threats-transform-chinas-uighur-heartland-into-security-state idUSKBN173A 
S. 
 42 Liu Caiyu, Islamic Communities Urged to Uphold Sinicization, Improve Political 
Stance, GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018),  http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1134757.shtml 
(note that GLOBAL TIMES is owned by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee). 
 43 Id.; Boehm, supra note 36. 
 44 Thum, supra note 7. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Dillon, supra note 19 (explaining the influence of Islam on the Uyghurs). 
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organization.49 Following Deng’s rise to power and the subsequent easing of 
many of the Communist Party’s more repressive policies, Islam in China ex-
perienced something of a renaissance.50 Religion returned to prominence in 
the region, and assumed many of its previous functions in Uyghur society.51 
Under President Xi, however, the government’s approach to Islam has swung 
back toward repression.52 
Of equal importance to Islam’s role in Uyghur identity is the idea of Uy-
ghur autonomy. The Chinese government designates Xinjiang an autonomous 
region, which should in theory grant it some measure of self-rule, but this is 
still a far cry from the self-governance that the Uyghurs have held at various 
times throughout history.53 There is some evidence to suggest that many Uy-
ghurs today view Chinese rule in the region as illegitimate.54 China has re-
sponded by cracking down on separatist sentiment, but in the past, crack-
downs have led to further calls for independence.55 Calls for separatism are 
voiced internationally by a growing number of Uyghur diaspora organizations 
as well.56 
 
ii. Beijing’s Agenda for Xinjiang 
 
The current situation in Xinjiang is part of a broader agenda by President 
Xi which seeks to recentralize and cement power in the hands of the Com-
munist Party while projecting a powerful image of unity and strength both 
domestically and abroad.57 The policy of objectives entailed in this broader 
agenda have large implications in Xinjiang as well. Appreciating how this 
agenda has sharpened the government’s actions in Xinjiang requires one to 
examine the intersection of traditional Han culture and communism, the na-
ture of Chinese governance, and the agenda itself. 
Over the last several decades, the Chinese Communist Party has effec-
tively replaced many aspects of what one might call traditional Han culture 
 
 49 Hasmath, supra note 40, at 46. 
 50 Dillon supra note 19, at 71. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Thum, supra note 7. 
 53 Id.; Moneyhon, supra note 3, at 126, 136. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Boehm, supra note 36, at 66. 
 56 Shichor, supra note 24, at 126. 
 57 Banyan, Can Xi Jinping Make Use of the Power he has Accumulated?, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/china/2018/03/31/can-xi-jinpin 
g-make-use-of-the-power-he-has-accumulated; Editorial, China’s President Just Laid Out 
a Worrying Vision for the World, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpos 
t.com/opinions/global-opinions/xi-jinpings-ambitions-ought-to-concern-the-worlds-demo 
cratic-nations/2017/10/18/53c8c9d8-b41c-11e7-a90a3470754bbb9_story.html. 
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with its values.58 Despite the West’s perception of Chinese culture as being 
ancient and spread throughout China, the idea of a China unified by Han cul-
ture is relatively modern, dating to the end of Qing rule (in the early twentieth 
century).59 By incorporating Chinese myth with ethnonationalist rhetoric, the 
idea of a Han ethnicity gained significant traction early on.60 Chinese intellec-
tuals, inspired in part by Western conceptions of ethnicity, endeavored to 
unify China under the umbrella of Han ethnicity.61 During the Cultural Revo-
lution, however, the Communist Party denounced what it called “Han chau-
vinisim [sic]”62 and sought to destroy many elements of traditional Chinese 
culture.63 However, after Mao’s death, the Communist Party embraced and 
co-opted Han nationalism as a way to maintain political legitimacy as it piv-
oted away from Mao’s immensely destructive policies.64 Deng Xiaoping and 
his successors combined Han nationalism with Maoist rhetoric and remade 
the Party’s image from top to bottom, paying rhetorical lip service to Marxist 
thought while adopting a more pragmatic system under the guise of Han eth-
nic identity.65 Xi Jinping has taken this one step further by using Han ethnona-
tionalist arguments to take an expansive view of Chinese sovereignty.66 
China’s governing structure renders it effectively a one-party state in 
which the Communist Party, which includes about 70% of its legislature’s 
delegates and almost all of the government’s senior officials, exerts almost 
total control over the government.67 Policy formulated by those at the very top 
of the Communist Party who serve on the Politburo and is then approved by 
the National People’s Congress.68 The Politburo is elected by the Communist 
Party’s Central Committee, which is controlled by Xi Jinping, who, in addi-
tion to his role as President, serves as the Communist Party’s General Secre-
tary.69 In recent years Xi has consolidated authority even further, launching an 
anti-corruption campaign which he has used to remove potential rivals and 
 
 58 Hayden Windrow, From State to Nation: The Forging of the Han through Language 
Policy in the PRC and Taiwan, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 373, 397-98 (2005). 
 59 Id. at 382-83. 
 60 Id. at 385-86. 
 61 Id. at 384. 
 62 Thum, supra note 7. 
 63 Windrow, supra note 58, at 397. 
 64 John M. Friend & Bradley A. Thayer, The Rise of Han-Centrism and What It Means 
 65 Windrow, supra note 58, at 399-400. 
 66 Id.; Boehm, supra note 36, at 77. 
 67 National People’s Congress, BBC: How China is Ruled,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/sha 
red/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/government/html/7.stm (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Politburo, BBC: How China is Ruled, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth 
/china_politics/government/html/4.stm (last visited Sept. 24, 2019); Li Xia, Xi Focus: Xi 
Requires Deepening CPC’s Self-Reform, XINHUANET (June 25, 2019), http://www.xinhuan 
et.com/english/2019-06/25/c_13817 3020.htm (note that Xinhua is the official state-run 
press agency of the PRC, subordinate to the Chinese government). 
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install loyalists in high ranking positions.70 He has also created new bureau-
cratic agencies to continue this mission outside of the halls of power with the 
express goal of cementing the Communist Party’s grip on power for years to 
come. 71 In both name and function, therefore, Xi Jinping wields more author-
ity than any one person in the Communist Party since Mao Zedong. 
The agenda President Xi has pursued is reflected in his policies and rheto-
ric. His government has taken great care in crafting an agenda aimed at recen-
tralizing power in the hands of the Communist Party.72 He has used populist 
appeals in rallying support for an expansive view of Chinese territorial sover-
eignty internationally.73 Domestically, his government has cracked down on 
dissidents and made extensive use of nationalistic rhetoric to sell his “China 
Dream” to the Chinese people.74 This rhetoric is backed by assimilationist 
policies in Xinjiang.75 The chauvinistic policies eschewed by the Communist 
Party’s founder have become part of a national agenda aimed at sinicizing 
minority ethnicities. 
 
iii. Justifying the Campaign 
 
In contrast to the relatively complex interplay of ideas forming the foun-
dation of the Xi administration’s national agenda, the justification for the cam-
paign against the Uyghurs is relatively simple. The Global Times, which is 
owned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, has writ-
ten that policies in the region “have given priority to anti-secession and coun-
ter-terrorism so as to maintain stable development, and Western media should 
see the situation themselves before accusing China.”76 The Communist Party 
of China’s news agency has also attributed the following statement regarding 
the reasons for what it calls a “vocational education and training program” 
(the government’s preferred term for its internment camps) to Xinjiang offi-
cial Shohrat Zakir: “The move aims to prevent the majority of those who com-
mitted petty crimes from becoming victims of terrorism and extremism.”77 
 
 70 Banyan, supra note 57. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Editorial, supra note 57. 
 74 Friend & Thayer, supra note 64. 
 75 Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, The Second Front – Again? The Rising 
Tide of Global Jihadism in East and Southeast Asia, 13 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
131, 162 (2018). 
 76 Liu Xin, Xinjiang Policies Justified, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), http://www.glob 
altimes.cn/content/1115202.shtml (note that this statement is attributed to “Chinese ex-
perts” without the use of quotations). 
 77 Liu Caiyu, Xinjiang Stability on the Rise, GLOBAL TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1123155.shtml (note that this statement is attributed 
without the use of quotations). 
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Claims of a terrorist threat in Xinjiang are not unfounded, but should be 
treated with skepticism. The Chinese government often restricts access to in-
formation when it has the potential to reflect poorly on its agenda, but bomb-
ings have occurred in Xinjiang, a series of which took place in 1992 targeting 
buses and more attacks on January 22, 2005 which killed thirteen people.78 A 
terrorist organization calling itself the Organization for Turkestan Freedom 
claimed responsibility for a Beijing bus bombing in 1997.79 While credible, 
precise data on the number of attacks and the number of casualties inflicted is 
unavailable, there is ample evidence to support the claim that separatist and 
extremist terrorism has been a problem in Xinjiang in the past.80 However, 
other clashes between Uyghurs and the Han government in Xinjiang reveal 
another side to this narrative. In February 1997, hundreds of Uyghur protes-
tors marched in the streets demanding the release of imprisoned clerics and 
better employment opportunities.81 After their violent dispersal by police, ap-
proximately 300 were rounded up and summarily executed, though official 
reports number the total deaths at nine.82 
Examination of how the Communist Party’s media apparatus has ap-
proached the threat of separatism and extremism underscores a connection 
between the government’s agenda in Xinjiang and the harsh measures used to 
implement it. The threat of terrorist activity in Xinjiang, while certainly a real 
issue, is being used as justification for an overwhelming government re-
sponse. The Global Times echoes this justification with statements such as: 
“Authorities in Hami, Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
gion, urged suspects of violence and terrorism and those influenced by the 
three evil forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism to surrender within 
30 days for leniency.”83 Using these “three evil forces” as justification has 
become an integral part of a campaign that goes well beyond merely combat-
ting extremist activities. 
 
C. The Campaign Against the Uyghurs 
 
The broader agenda in Xinjiang is pursued through a campaign unlike an-
ything that has come before it. In years past, most attempts at purging a 
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perceived dissident population were made by either forcibly removing them 
from the country, murdering members of the group en masse, or some combi-
nation of the two.84 The Xi administration’s (and by extension the Communist 
Party’s) agenda for Xinjiang seeks to accomplish the same basic goal of re-
moving dissidents and potential dissidents belonging to an ethnic group with-
out the international condemnation and internal strife involved in forced mi-
gration and genocide. The result is what a sort of genocide of the mind 
wherein the perceived source of the dissidence, here Uyghur culture, is elim-
inated via forced indoctrination into another culture, in this case the Com-
munist Party’s iteration of Han ethnonationalism. In Xinjiang this effort has 
three key components. The first is a vast surveillance network which com-
bines a large and extremely active police presence with cutting edge technol-
ogy designed to monitor the populace at all times. The second is the da fa, 
meaning “strike hard,” campaign which arrests dissidents and anyone with 
even a remote connection to dissident activity. The third is the internment 
camps themselves which forcibly re-educate those arrested. 
 
i. A Dragnet Like No Other: The Xinjiang Surveillance State 
 
The campaign against the Uyghurs makes use of a vast surveillance net-
work unlike anything that has existed before it. Xinjiang and its capital, 
Urumqi, have been made what has been called a twenty-first century police 
state85 and the world’s most heavily guarded place.86 Indeed if one defines a 
“police state” as a state in which a repressive government uses police force to 
control all aspects of life,87 it can be argued that there is no better modern 
example than Xinjiang today. In building a sophisticated police state of this 
size and scope, the Chinese government has combined more traditional polic-
ing tactics like roadblocks and checkpoints with an extremely sophisticated 
surveillance apparatus which makes use of cutting-edge technology to con-
stantly monitor the populace. 
Even without the use of technology, Xinjiang might still be considered one 
of the most tightly monitored areas in the world. Police are almost everywhere 
in the region, particularly in more urban areas, where many shop assistants 
 
   84 Consider as examples the Soviet Union’s policy of dekulakization, genocide against 
the Tutsi and Twa during the Rwandan Civil War, Darfur genocide, and ongoing conflict 
in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. 
 85 Like No Other, supra note 5. 
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State Overwhelms Daily Life, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/t 
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have joined the police force to meet the requirement that all shops and restau-
rants have a part-time officer on duty.88 In some cities, there are police check-
points virtually everywhere, with as many as four or five every kilometer.89 
Police regularly take fingerprints and blood samples, and use paper forms to 
collect personal information from Uyghurs.90 Roving, six-person teams of po-
lice and local officials go door to door “compiling dossiers of personal infor-
mation.”91 Among the information Xinjiang’s residents are required to dis-
close is their religious faith along with where and how often they worship.92 
Police also require residents to disclose any foreign contacts, their relationship 
to those contacts, and whether they have any relatives who have been de-
tained.93 Additionally, travel for Uyghurs has been made almost impossible 
because in addition to having to leave their passports with local public safety 
bureaus, many have found it difficult to book hotels or buy tickets for rail or 
air transportation.94 All of these measures are supplemented by human intel-
ligence as well. Chinese officials have attempted to intimidate Uyghurs living 
abroad by threatening family members who remain in the region.95 Some Uy-
ghurs cannot even escape the police presence at home as the government has 
created a program in which local families adopt officials, who visit regularly 
to teach Mandarin and to verify information given to the police.96 In effect, 
police are present nearly at every possible moment in Xinjiang. 
The physical police presence in Xinjiang today is pervasive, but what 
makes Xinjiang’s surveillance network special is its use of technology. 
Though not for lack of effort, police and other officials would not realistically 
be able to surveil Xinjiang’s populace at every waking moment without the 
aid of perhaps the most technologically sophisticated and pervasive digital 
surveillance system anywhere in the world.97 Uyghurs in the region can face 
arrest for failing to download smartphone applications that enable authorities 
to constantly track their location.98 Police officers carry handsets that can scan 
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phones to instantly determine whether the appropriate applications have been 
installed.99 At checkpoints, police seize phones and download the phone’s 
data for subsequent analysis.100 Even if one does not own a smartphone, the 
network is essentially built into government records, so a simple scan of an 
identification card or even the use of an iris-recognition program can provide 
information as well.101 The Xinjiang surveillance network also includes a 
massive DNA database containing tens of millions of samples.102 The surveil-
lance network continually monitors people by using cameras and microphones 
equipped with sophisticated facial and vocal recognition software.103 By using 
these technologies in conjunction with a massive police presence, government 
officials in Xinjiang have created a dragnet surveillance apparatus capable of 
constantly monitoring the Xinjiang’s Uyghurs to an extent almost unimagina-
ble in previous decades. 
 
ii. Da Fa Meaning “Strike Hard” 
 
Surveillance is only part of the reason for the size and scope of police pres-
ence in Xinjiang. Police force is also used in implementing the government’s 
“strike hard” tactics. As a police tactic, Strike Hard was first implemented as 
part of a crackdown on crime across China in Spring 1996.104 Under the lead-
ership of Xinjiang’s new Party Secretary, Chen Quanguo, the renewed cam-
paign in Xinjiang has seen a surge in both the number of personnel involved 
and the aggression with which these security forces operate.105 Police conduct 
the individual strikes with little regard for discipline, and police have shot 
those who refuse to cooperate.106 The raids target Uyghur neighborhoods and 
frequently uncover materials of which Beijing does not approve.107 The strikes 
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also target Uyghur literature, music, religious texts, and the Uyghur language, 
and any material teaching these subjects is seized and burned.108 
Strike Hard can be seen as both supplementing and being bolstered by the 
surveillance network. Arrests can be made through individual strikes against 
those found by the surveillance network to espouse politically incorrect be-
liefs. These arrests can also create reasons for further arrests when someone 
is found to be in possession of materials labelled by the government as prop-
agating extremism, so the Strike Hard campaign can cut both ways. 
 
iii. Xinjiang’s Internment Camps 
 
In terms of achieving Beijing’s agenda in Xinjiang, the surveillance system 
and Strike Hard are best seen as tools used to facilitate the process by which 
the government exorcises Uyghur culture from its practitioners. The principle 
tool by which the Chinese government actually achieves this goal is a growing 
array of what the Chinese government euphemistically refers to as “vocational 
skill education training centers.”109 It is inside these facilities where the actual 
process of re-education occurs. 
Some have reported that they were first jailed locally before being trans-
ferred to these centers that now dot the region, and at least one man, a citizen 
of Kazakhstan who the Chinese government believed was helping some Uy-
ghurs to escape China, was interrogated and tortured extensively before ever 
setting foot in a reeducation camp.110 Though the Chinese government has 
attempted to shroud much of what it does in these camps in secrecy, a number 
of former internees have described the inner workings of these camps despite 
threats made by the government against their families.111 
Once inside the camps, internees are kept in overcrowded cells with poor 
sanitary conditions.112 Their living situation is made worse by restrictions on 
bathing and on the religious washing required of practicing Muslims.113 When 
not in their cells, their new teachers require them to sing songs praising the 
Communist Party or memorize Confucian texts, and they are regularly tested 
on their knowledge of Mandarin and on how well they can recite the assigned 
 
 108 Boehm, supra note 36, at 82. 
 109 Ben Westcott, China Legalizes Xinjiang Re-Education Camps After Denying They 
Exist, CNN (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/xinjiang-china-reeduca 
tion-camps-intl/index.html. 
 110 Gerry Shih, ‘Permanent Cure’: Inside the Re-Education Camps China is Using to 
Brainwash Muslim, BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/what- 
is-life-like-in-xinjiang-reeducation-camps-china-2018-5. 
 111 William Yang, How China Intimidates Uighurs Abroad by Threating Their Families, 
DEUTSCHE WELLS (July 11, 2019)  https://www.dw.com/en/how-china-intimidates-uighur- 
uigs-abroad-by-threatening-their-families/a-49554977. 
 112 Shih, supra note 110. 
 113 Id. 
2019] SILENCING XINJIANG 249 
Communist propaganda.114 The internees are not simply forced to embrace 
Han culture, they are required to denounce their own and repudiate the “three 
evil forces.” 115 All internees are required to stand at the front of a group of 
their peers while they profess their admiration for the Party and their disdain 
for their own religious and cultural practices.116 They are rewarded if they 
mirror official lines well or if they criticize others particularly harshly for their 
asserted wrongdoings.117 This can be a difficult task, as some internees are 
farmers who are there simply for failing to speak Mandarin, a language they 
may have never learned.118 Any semblance of religious behavior is banned, 
and anyone who fails to comply with this and other rules can be locked in so-
called tiger chairs, which restrain arms and legs for a full day.119 
Still, what several of those who have spoken about the camps have de-
scribed as the worst part of the experience is the psychological pressure stem-
ming from the repetitiveness of their “lessons.” For months or potentially 
years on end, internees repeat the humiliating process of being forced to de-
nounce and denigrate their own culture while receiving constant political in-
doctrination.120 The psychological pressure placed on them is enormous, in-
tentional, and aimed directly at eradicating any potentially dissident 
thought.121 Their words and actions are closely monitored for even a sem-
blance of politically incorrect behavior, and anyone who violates the rules is 
swiftly punished.122 The pressure is so great that multiple internees reported 
either having attempted or considered suicide, and while the chief goal does 
seem to be indoctrination, most of those who have spoken about their experi-
ences report witnessing brutal beatings at the hands of the security forces that 
guard the facility.123 The entire process is designed to sever the connection 
between the internees and their culture. One document obtained by journalists 
asserted that the camps must “break their lineage, break their roots, break their 
connections, and break their origins.”124 
Those who have “graduated” (word used in statements from “graduates” 
of the camps) are used as forced labor in factories that have been built inside 
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the camps.125 The facilities are referred to as “black factories” because they 
offer little pay and difficult conditions.126 Details from inside these factories 
are as tightly controlled as information from inside the internment camps, and 
there is some dispute as to whether the workers are paid at all, but employment 
does not appear to be optional.127 
III. COVENANTS AND COMMUNISM: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW IN 
XINJIANG 
International law and Chinese law are both implicated by the policies 
China’s government has implemented in Xinjiang. Numerous international 
agreements prohibit policies aimed at suppressing ethnic and religious minor-
ities. Of particular relevance to the situation in Xinjiang today are the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both 
of which have been ratified by the Chinese government.128 These two agree-
ments both impose affirmative obligations on China’s government, so an 
overview of relevant Chinese law is required as well. 
 
A. The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
The Racial Discrimination Convention defines racial discrimination as: 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights 
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and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life.129 
States parties to the Racial Discrimination Convention are obligated to im-
plement a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all forms.130 In order 
to understand this obligation and others in the Convention it is necessary to 
appreciate the genesis of the Convention, the relevant obligations under it, 
how those obligations are monitored, and the relevant enforcement body’s ob-
servations on China’s compliance with the Convention. 
 
i. To End Racial Discrimination: Relevant Background on the 
Racial Discrimination Convention 
 
The influences on the Racial Discrimination Convention are varied and 
complicated, and they underscore a general attitude of opposition toward ra-
cial discrimination in the international community which has grown stronger 
over time.131 Of equal import in assessing Xinjiang under the Racial Discrim-
ination Convention is an understanding of China’s approach to the Conven-
tion and the reservations it made when China ratified the Convention in 
1981.132 
The Racial Discrimination Convention was born of a desire to put an end 
to discrimination against nonwhite persons.133 When the United Nations be-
gan to seriously consider the issue of continued manifestations of racial hatred 
and discrimination in 1960, the idea of an international convention to end ra-
cial discrimination had not yet gained serious traction.134 However, the next 
year, the Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Committee on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities suggested that just such an instru-
ment be created.135 Over the course of the next several years, delegates from 
various countries debated the idea, with a large number voicing support, but 
the issue of whether religious discrimination should be addressed via the same 
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agreement posed a particular problem for several states, particularly majority-
Muslim Arab countries.136 The issue of racial discrimination was then severed 
from religious discrimination, meaning that while the Racial Discrimination 
Convention does encompass a variety of forms of discrimination distinct from 
race, it does not cover religious anti-Semitism or anti-Muslim policies insofar 
as they are unrelated to questions of race.137 The Sub-Committee on Discrim-
ination began work in January 1964, and the Convention was quickly adopted 
in December of the following year.138 It entered into force in January 1969.139 
China’s 1981 ratification of the Racial Discrimination Convention came 
with a reservation. China is not bound by Article 22 of the Convention,140 
which states that disputes which go unresolved by the procedures in the Con-
vention may be settled by the International Court of Justice, unless otherwise 
agreed by the disputant parties.141 China’s reservation simply means that 
should there be some dispute with another party, China cannot be forced to 
defend its policies in the International Court of Justice because of its obliga-
tions under the Racial Discrimination Convention. 
 
ii. Provisions Relevant to Xinjiang 
 
In addition to a sweeping definition of racial discrimination that includes 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity142 and the imposition of and obligation 
to condemn and eliminate such practices, the Racial Discrimination Conven-
tion also contains an enumerated list of rights to which citizens are entitled 
enjoy equally.143 Of greatest relevance to the Chinese government’s actions 
in Xinjiang are the obligation to eliminate racial discrimination contained in 
Article 2 and the equal protection of enjoyment with regard to certain rights 
enumerated in Article 5.144 
Keeping in mind the definition of racial discrimination laid out in Article 
1145, any inquiry as to whether a state is complying with its obligations under 
the Racial Discrimination Convention requires an assessment of the specific 
actions required by the Convention. Article 2 clarifies the obligation to end 
racial discrimination as defined in Article 1 by stating: “States Parties 
 
 136 Id. at 28. 
 137 Meron, supra note 133, at 284. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Reservation of the People’s Republic of China to the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Jan. 13, 1982), available at http://indic 
ators.ohchr.org/. 
 141 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 129, at art. 22. 
   142 Id. at art. 1, para. 1. 
   143 Id. at 5(e)(i)-(v). 
   144 Id. at arts. 2, 5. 
   145 Id. at art. 1, para. 1. 
2019] SILENCING XINJIANG 253 
condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate 
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its 
forms and promoting understanding among all races . . . .”146 States bound by 
the convention therefore must “undertake[] to engage in no act or practice of 
racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to 
ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, 
shall act in conformity with this obligation.”147 Moreover, “Each State Party 
shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and local pol-
icies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have 
the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it ex-
ists.”148 The Racial Discrimination Convention poses very clear requirements 
to directly confront and end all forms of racial discrimination, including those 
perpetuated by government bodies, without delay.149 
Article 5 is less clear cut, but the obligations it specifies are no less im-
portant.150 Its chapeau states: 
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in 
article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to pro-
hibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and 
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to 
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the 
law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights . . . .151 
The text of the chapeau would seem to indicate that the requirement is 
simply equality in enjoyment of those rights, which an illiberal state might 
interpret to be met if all groups are equally restricted in, for example, the free 
exercise of religion. While it cannot be said that Article 5 establishes a com-
mitment on the part of a state party to guarantee one of the Article 5 rights, it 
has been increasingly interpreted to pose its enumerated rights not as being 
subsidiary to the right to equal treatment before the law but as requirements 
imposed on states parties as part of a necessary framework for measures to 
combat racial discrimination as defined in Article 1.152 To put it more simply, 
the human rights framework of the Racial Discrimination Convention effec-
tively assumes recognition of the rights enumerated in Article 5.153 Applied to 
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Article 5 is “[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . .”154 
Such an interpretation of Article 5 could be said to impose a freedom from 
religious discrimination, at least where it stems from racial discrimination as 
defined in Article 1.155 Other included Article 5 rights include freedom of ex-
pression156 and of peaceful assembly and association,157 among others. 
 
iii. Ensuring Compliance: The Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination158 
 
Article 8 of  the Racial Discrimination Convention establishes the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which serves as the Con-
vention’s compliance mechanism.159 Nothing in the Convention compels the 
states parties to comply, instead they are required to submit regular reports 
that the Committee weighs in on and offers its recommendations.160 As such, 
its primary function is to report on the various measures states parties imple-
ment in meeting the Convention’s requirements. 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Racial Discrimination Convention establish the 
committee, detail its composition, and provide its mandate.161 The first para-
graph of Article 8 establishes that the committee shall be composed, 
of eighteen experts of high moral standing and acknowledged 
impartiality elected by States Parties from among their nation-
als, who shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration 
being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the 
representation of the different forms of civilization as well as 
of the principal legal systems.162 
These experts are nominated by states parties and elected by secret bal-
lot163 to serve four year terms.164 The bulk of the Racial Discrimination Com-
mittee’s work is composed of examining and issuing recommendations based 
on state reports on their progress towards the Convention’s goals.165 Article 9 
further empowers the Racial Discrimination Committee to examine state 
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reports and issue suggestions and general recommendations on which states 
parties can issue comments.166 
The Racial Discrimination Committee is also empowered to resolve inter-
state disputes regarding the actions of one state party referred from another 
state party. This process begins with an inter-state communication process in 
which one state details an allegation that another state party is not in compli-
ance with its obligations under the Racial Discrimination Convention to which 
the other state party provides written statements clarifying the matter.167 If this 
does not resolve the matter, by any negotiation procedure open to the states 
parties, within three months, an independent, ad hoc commission is formed to 
seek an appropriate conclusion acceptable to both parties.168 This procedure 
has not yet been tested in practice.169 
 
iv. China’s 2018 Periodic Report to the Racial Discrimination 
Committee 
 
China has made a report to the Racial Discrimination Committee as re-
cently as 2017.170 China declined to issue comments on the concluding obser-
vations made by the Racial Discrimination Committee, so the relevant items 
for analysis are the portions of the state report, the submissions of various 
nongovernmental organizations, and the Committee’s concluding observa-
tions pertaining to Xinjiang. 
China’s 2018 report to the Racial Discrimination Committee makes ex-
plicit reference to the Uyghurs and to Xinjiang.171 However, there is no men-
tion of the typical euphemisms used when discussing the internment camps in 
the region.172 Instead, Xinjiang is largely discussed in the context of economic 
development,173 protection of the Uyghur language,174 or protections of reli-
gious exercise.175 These assertions contradict numerous other reports, and 
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of the Convention, U.N. Doc. C/CHN/14-17 (Apr. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Chinese Delega-
tion’s Racial Discrimination Report] (note that while China’s report was received in Janu-
ary 2017, it was not considered until August 2018). 
 171 See generally id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at paras. 19-21. 
 174 E.g., id. at para. 66. 
 175 E.g., id. at para. 95. 
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given the Chinese government’s past rhetoric on Xinjiang,176 merit significant 
skepticism. China’s report highlights a fundamental problem with information 
about Xinjiang: the Chinese government is likely to maintain publicly that its 
policies on Xinjiang have brought prosperity and stability to a region once rife 
with terrorism, even if such a position is undermined by credible accounts of 
human rights abuses in the region. 
The Chinese government’s public position was, in fact, publicly disputed 
by several non-governmental organizations, many of which included descrip-
tions of Xinjiang’s internment camps.177 Submissions from non-governmental 
organizations also included evidence regarding the prohibition of the Uyghur 
language,178 systemic violations of China’s criminal procedure law which tar-
get Uyghurs,179 and the use of sophisticated mass surveillance techniques.180 
These reports and others are in stark contrast to the report filed by China as a 
state party, and several allege systemic suppression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.181 
The allegations made by non-governmental organizations and others are 
given weight in the Racial Discrimination Committee’s concluding observa-
tions and recommendations. Taking care to note the Chinese delegation’s 
statements the Committee expressed alarm at reports of detention centers182 
and similar reports of mass surveillance targeting Uyghurs.183 The Committee 
recommended that the Chinese government release those detained in extra-
legal facilities and allow them opportunity for redress, investigate allegations 
 
 176 E.g., Liu, supra note 76; Li Qingping, China Explores Effective Governance of Reli-
gion in Secular World, GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), http://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1134750.shtml. 
 177 E.g., AMNESTY INT’L SUBMISSION, CHINA: SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 96TH SESSION, 6-30 AUGUST 
2018 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/8742/2018/en/ [hereinafter 
Amnesty Int’l Submission]. 
 178 ASIAN SOLIDARITY COUNCIL FOR FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY, SUBMISSION TO 
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 4 (2018), http 
s://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1441796.html. 
 179 WORLD UYGHUR CONG., PARALLEL SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (CERD) FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(PRC) 1 (2018), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/CHN/ 
INT_CERD_NGO_CHN_31745_E.pdf. 
 180 AMNESTY INT’L SUBMISSION, supra note 177, at 13. 
 181 E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH SUBMISSION TO THE CERD 
REVIEW OF CHINA 1 (2018), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Docu 
ments/CHN/INT_CERD_NGO_CHN_31595_E.pdf. 
 182 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the 
Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic Reports of China (including Hong Kong, 
China and Macao, China), para. 40(a), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17 (Sept. 19, 
2018). 
 183 Id. at para. 40(b). 
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of “ethno-religious profiling,” and provide detailed information on detention 
facilities including the content of any political curriculum.184 
 
B. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
 
The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights185 poses affirmative obligations on states parties. Given that the focus 
of this Note is not economic discrimination, discussion will be confined to 
two fundamental rights violated by the Chinese government’s actions in Xin-
jiang namely, the right to self-determination and the right to freely take part 
in cultural life. Discussion of this agreement will, therefore, not include a 
treatment of China’s reservations which do not  directly pertain to these rights 
and nor affect their application.186 Additionally, this Note will not explore in 
any depth China’s most recent periodic report which contains only a limited 
discussion on cultural rights as they pertain to the Uyghur language.187 The 
right to self-determination is foundational to economic, social and cultural 
rights, and these rights can be seen as stemming from this foundational 
right.188 Conversely, cultural rights only occupy a small portion of the ESCR 
Covenant, and have previously been viewed as something of a lost cate-
gory.189 Nevertheless, the Article 15 right “to take part in cultural life,”190 can 
and should be discussed, particularly considering the international interest in 
the protection of minority cultures. In order to understand these rights and 
their application, one must consider the relevant background and context on 
the ESCR Covenant, which liberties it is meant to protect, and the mechanism 
by which it protects them. 
 
 
 
 
 184 Id. at para. 41. 
 185 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ESCR Covenant]. This treaty, which entered into force on Jan. 3, 
1976, has 169 parties. The United States, which signed Oct. 5, 1977, is a signatory and 
China, which ratified on Mar. 27, 2001, is a party. 
 186 See Reservation of the People’s Republic of China to the ESCR Covenant (Mar. 27, 
2001), available at http://indicators.ohchr.org. 
 187 See Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on 
the Second Periodic Report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, 
U.N. Doc. C.12/CHN/CO/2 (2014). 
 188 See ESCR Covenant, supra note 185, at art. 1. 
 189 Dominic McGoldrick, Culture, Cultures, and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 447, 453 (Mashood A. Baderin & Robert McCorquodale 
eds., 2007). 
 190 ESCR Covenant, supra note 185, at art. 15, para. 1(a). 
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i. Background to the ESCR Covenant and the Rights Therein 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights can be a difficult area in international 
law. These rights have been criticized as non-justiciable and seen merely as 
goals to be achieved at some undefined point in the future.191 This is partially 
because these rights can be seen as positive liberties stemming from an actual 
ability to self-determine as opposed to negative liberties stemming from the 
absence of outside impediments to self-determination.192 This distinction has 
generated problems for cultural rights enforcement in particular. 
Part of the problem is that economic, social and cultural rights are often 
seen as being distinct from civil and political rights.193 Moreover, in the past, 
some theorists have seen economic, social and cultural rights as coming sec-
ond behind civil and political rights.194 These rights were severed from an 
initial draft of rights that included civil and political rights early on in the 
drafting process.195 In part because of this distinction, but despite this setback 
and others associated with drafting an agreement, these rights were eventually 
adopted into an international agreement in 1966.196 The resulting Covenant 
still did not enter into force for another ten years after it was adopted owing 
in large part to the belief that while civil and political rights were fundamental 
liberties that could enter effect immediately, economic, social and cultural 
rights were aspirational and could only be achieved progressively.197   
Very little of the ESCR Covenant deals with cultural rights.198 So, in an 
international agreement which has been often noted as inherently less justici-
able and more aspirational than other international agreements, cultural rights 
may appear to be second-class rights even amongst other second-class 
rights.199 However, the end of the international tensions surrounding the Cold 
War brought renewed appreciation for economic, social, and cultural rights, 
and today they receive much the same treatment as to other treaty obliga-
tions.200 The rise of multi-culturalist thinking in the new millennium has also 
 
 191 Baderin & McCorquodale, Introduction to The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Forty Years of Development, in Baderin & McCorquodale, 
supra note 189, at 10. 
 192 Id.; see generally Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/. 
 193 Baderin & McCorquodale, supra note 189, at 5. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 3. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 6. 
 198 See generally ESCR Covenant, supra note 185. 
 199 See McGoldrick, supra note 189, at 447 (noting cultural rights as “the failed Cinder-
ella of the international human rights lexicon”). 
 200 MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL., THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 2 (Malcolm 
Langford et. al. eds., 2016). 
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fueled new scholarship on cultural rights; so while cultural rights, particularly 
the right of participation in culture, remain under studied, their rise in promi-
nence has given them new weight at the international level.201 
 
ii. An Emergent Interdependence: Relevant Portions of the ESCR 
Covenant 
 
Cultural rights under the ESCR Covenant, including the right to self-de-
termination and cultural development, on their face, pose certain interpretive 
problems.202 With regard to the right to self-determination,  an issue exists as 
to the proper scope of a right that otherwise might be interpreted as encom-
passing many more freedoms than the ones enumerated in the Covenant itself. 
The right to take part in cultural life can appear to beg the question of what 
constitutes culture and whether that right functions as an individual or collec-
tive right. In order to properly apply these rights, it is therefore necessary to 
examine how each of them functions under the ESCR Covenant. 
The very first Article of the ESCR Covenant provides: “All peoples have 
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural de-
velopment.”203 By the language of the Article, the right to self-determination 
serves as the foundation for the other rights provided in the Covenant, and the 
word “peoples” indicates that it is a group right, and it has largely been inter-
preted as such.204 Even as a group right, an expansive definition of self-deter-
mination would inherently bring the scope of such a right well beyond the 
rights enumerated in the Covenant, and without limitation, may serve as a 
right to revolution.205 Such an interpretation would be unacceptable to many 
states parties, so it is entirely logical that the right be interpreted as confined 
to the scope of the economic, social, and cultural rights in the Covenant.206 To 
put it another way, the right to self-determination, while foundational to the 
Covenant, is limited in practice to the scope of the other rights contained in 
the Covenant. 
 
 201 McGoldrick, supra note 189, at 448. 
 202 See Richard Burchill, Democracy and the Promotion and Protection of Socio-Eco-
nomic Rights, in Baderin & McCorquodale, supra note 189, at 275; McGoldrick, supra 
note 189, at 449-450. 
 203 ESCR Covenant, supra note 185, at art. 1, para. 1. 
 204 See ESCR Covenant, supra note 185, at art. 1, para. 1; Malcolm Langford, Substantive 
Obligations, in MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 200. 
 205 U.N. Educ., Scientific, and Cultural Org., International Meeting of Experts on Further 
Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples: Final Report and Recommendations, ¶5, 
U.N. Doc. SHS-89/CONF.602/7 (Feb. 22, 1990). 
 206 Econ. and Soc. Council, Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/105 (Dec. 10, 1996). 
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The scope of the right to self-determination under Article 1 therefore cre-
ates interplay between self-determination and Article 15 which states: “The 
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To 
take part in cultural life . . . .”207 For years the right to cultural participation 
resisted interpretation,208 but, in 2009, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights issued General Comment 21 clarifying its appropriate 
scope and function.209 The resulting interpretation clarified that the right to 
take part in cultural life both obligates a state party to abstain from interfer-
ence and take steps to promote cultural life.210 General Comment 21 further 
interprets the right to cultural participation as being applicable to individuals, 
associations of individuals, and communities or groups.211 The Committee 
also took a very broad approach to the activities falling within the scope of 
“cultural life,” including religion, beliefs systems, traditions, and non-verbal 
communication.212 Critically, the committee affirmed an interdependence be-
tween the right to cultural participation and self-determination.213 An interde-
pendence between self-determination and cultural participation strongly indi-
cates a construction of the right to self-determination as both foundational to 
and stemming from the right to cultural participation. 
 
iii. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights214 and 
its Optional Protocol 
 
The Covenant meant to ensure economic, social, and cultural rights does 
not itself create an independent treaty body parallel to the Racial Discrimina-
tion Committee. The ESCR Covenant initially required the submission of pe-
riodic reports on states parties’ progress under the Covenant to be made to the 
Economic and Social Council which, in turn, was empowered to establish a 
program to receive them.215 This process led to the creation of Sessional 
Working Groups, which were generally regarded as ineffective.216 One of 
these working groups eventually suggested that it should be made into a com-
mittee of independent experts, and with almost no opposition, the Economic 
and Social Council passed a resolution meeting the Working Group’s 
 
 207 ESCR Covenant, supra note 185, at art. 15, para. 1(a). 
 208 McGoldrick, supra note 189, at 453. 
   209 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural rights, General Comment No. 21 The Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, para. 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at para. 7. 
 212 Id. at para. 13. 
 213 Id. at para. 2. 
 214 Hereinafter ESCR Committee. 
 215 ESCR Covenant, supra note 185, at art. 17, para. 1. 
 216 Baderin & McCorquodale, supra note 189, at 8. 
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suggestion.217 The end result was a committee which functions and is treated 
by states parties as an independent treaty body.218 The ESCR Committee is 
composed of elected experts in much the same way as the Racial Discrimina-
tion Committee.219 Despite similarities in form and function, the ESCR Com-
mittee is not truly independent, as it remains theoretically accountable to the 
Economic and  Social Council.220 
The ESCR Covenant also lacks a process for either inter-state communi-
cations or communications from individuals or groups regarding a state 
party’s compliance.221 This issue was addressed in the 2008 Optional Protocol 
to the ESCR Covenant.222 However, the Committee is still not permitted to 
receive such communications regarding states parties to the Covenant if they 
are not also parties to the Optional Protocol.223 China is not a party to the 
Optional Protocol.224 As a member of the ESCR Covenant but not the Op-
tional Protocol, China is not subject to the Optional Protocol’s communica-
tions processes, rendering the Covenant’s periodic report process the sole 
mechanism for pressing the Chinese government to meet its obligations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Compare U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Review of the Composition, Organization and 
Administration Arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts 
on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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C. Chinese Domestic Law 225 
 
The affirmative obligations imposed on states parties to the Racial Discrimi-
nation Convention and the ESCR Covenant make an inquiry into domestic 
laws critical in evaluating whether a state is in compliance with international 
law. In China, several different statutes are relevant to such an inquiry. Any 
discussion of Chinese domestic law should begin with an examination into its 
Constitution and then turn to other sources, such as domestic laws commonly 
cited in discussions of China’s policies as they apply to international agree-
ments. These include: the Criminal Law, the National Security Law, the 
Counter-Terrorism Law, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regula-
tion on De-Extremification.   
 
i. Problems with Chinese Constitutional Law 
 
Deciphering the Chinese Constitution to the extent necessary to examine 
its precise compliance with, and application to, China’s international obliga-
tions highlights an interpretive problem in Chinese law. This problem is aptly 
illustrated by Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution which states: 
All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. 
The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minor-
ity nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of 
equality, unity, mutual assistance, and harmony among all of 
China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression 
of any nationality are prohibited; any act which undermines 
the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohib-
ited. 
The State assists areas inhabited by minority nationalities in 
accelerating their economic and cultural development 
 
 225 Sources of translated Chinese law are limited to Westlaw China which uses official 
translations provided by the Chinese Government. Where official translations are unavail-
able, as is the case with local laws, the Author has used China Law Translate, a website 
founded by Jeremy Daum of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, which relies on 
user driven translations. Translations from China Law Translate are cited in a manner con-
sistent with Mr. Daum’s instructions. Chinese Romanizations necessary for citation have 
been proofread by Willy Du, A Chinese Language Teaching Assistant at the University of 
Georgia’s Franklin College of Arts and Sciences who has spoken Chinese since an early 
age. For an in-depth examination of China’s counterterrorism framework broader in scope 
than the one in this note, see Enshen Li, Fighting the “Three Evils”: A Structural Analysis 
of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China, 33 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 311 (2019). 
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according to the characteristics and needs of the various mi-
nority nationalities. 
Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of mi-
nority nationalities live in concentrated communities; in these 
areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the 
power of autonomy. All national autonomous areas are inte-
gral parts of the People’s Republic of China.226 
The apparent problem is that very little regarding China’s policies toward 
ensuring non-discrimination can be gleaned from a plain reading of the text. 
Moreover, the prohibition of discrimination and oppression can easily come 
into conflict with punishment of actions that might undermine national unity 
or harmony. In its most recent report to the Racial Discrimination Committee, 
the Chinese delegation cited Article 4 as evidence of constitutional commit-
ment to the rights of ethnic minorities.227 However, Article 4 was also noted 
in Amnesty International’s report to the Racial Discrimination Committee in 
the context of highlighting discriminatory wording in the legal framework 
cited as evidence of equal treatment.228 To clarify, the problem is not that 
China does not have provisions in its Constitution that, at least nominally, 
would fulfill some international obligations, but that those provisions which 
would do so are often either contradicted, rendered ambiguous, or severely 
limited by the language immediately following it.229 Because the Chinese 
Constitution is rife with examples of such wording, one must look elsewhere 
in order to properly examine how Chinese law interacts with international law. 
 
ii. Developments in Chinese Criminal Law 
 
China’s criminal law, like much of the country’s law, comes in the form 
of a single, regularly amended statute. Article 4 of the Criminal Law reads: 
“The law shall be equally applied to anyone who commits a crime. No one 
shall have the privilege of transcending the law.”230 This Article establishes 
that the provisions in the criminal law shall apply equally to all persons who 
 
 226 XIANFA art. 4 (2018). 
 227 Chinese Delegation’s Racial Discrimination Report, supra note 170, at para. 7. 
 228 See AMNESTY INT’L SUBMISSION, supra note 177, at 1-2. 
 229 Compare, e.g. XIANFA art. 36, §1 (2018) (stating that citizens enjoy freedom of reli-
gious belief), with XIANFA art. 36, §3 (2018) (stating “the State protects normal religious 
activities”). 
 230 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997; 
rev’d most recently Aug. 29, 2015, effective Nov. 1, 2015) art. 4, translated in Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China, Westlaw China 万律, (Westlaw China). 
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commit crimes. Since the criminal law was originally passed in 1997, the Na-
tional People’s Congress has passed nine amendments to it, with the most re-
cent one entering into force in November 2015.231 Amnesty International 
made note of the most recent set of amendments in its report: “These offences 
are open to subjective interpretation, violating the legality requirement for 
criminal offences, and increasing the possibility of abusive, arbitrary and dis-
criminatory prosecution and conviction.”232 The amended Criminal Law in-
cluded Article 120c, which states: 
Whoever propagates terrorism or extremism by way of prepar-
ing or distributing books, audio and video materials or other 
items that propagate terrorism or extremism or by way of 
teaching or releasing information, etc. or instigates the terrorist 
activities shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not 
more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance 
or deprivation of political rights and concurrently sentenced to 
a fine. If the circumstances are serious, the person shall be sen-
tenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years 
and concurrently sentenced to a fine or confiscation of prop-
erty.233 
More concisely put, Article 120c criminalizes the distribution of any media 
that propagates terrorism or extremism, and sets out punishments for doing 
so.234 120c and several other Articles in the 2015 amendments impose crimi-
nal sentences for activity that is said to spread extremism, but fail to provide 
a definition for either terrorism or extremism.235 The Racial Discrimination 
Committee voiced concern in its closing observations on China regarding 
broad and vague language in Chinese laws,236 and recommended China re-
view its existing laws to ensure that these terms are defined narrowly and the 
existence of safeguards against abuse.237 
 
iii. China’s Counter-Terrorism Framework 
 
Relevant Chinese law on counter-terrorism contrasts with the Criminal 
Law in that it does not come in the form of a single piece of legislation, but 
from a framework of interconnected, sometimes overlapping laws functioning 
 
 231 Id. at Revision History. 
 232 AMNESTY INT’L SUBMISSION, supra note 177, at 3. 
 233 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 230, at art. 120c. 
 234 Id. 
 235 E.g., id. at art. 120d, art. 120e, art. 120f. 
 236 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 182, at para. 36. 
 237 Id. at art. 37. 
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at both the national and local levels.238 This network of laws does include a 
specific law dedicated to counter-terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, which creates a policy called “placement and ed-
ucation” that allows for the indefinite detention of criminals who have been 
convicted of crimes relating to extremism with some limitations.239 The Anti-
Terrorism Law also creates a mechanism by which someone who has com-
mitted a lesser offense of extremism (which can mean as little as possessing 
an illegal book)240 may be detained for up to fifteen days without having tech-
nically committed a crime.241 Local regulations enacted pursuant to the Anti-
Terrorism Law have imposed specific laws targeting Islamic practices includ-
ing: burqas,242 irregular name selection,243 and any other speech or acts seen 
to be promoting radicalization.244 Still, the most integral provision comes in 
Article 2 of the National Security Law: 
National security shall refer to the status whereby the State’s 
political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the 
welfare of its people, its sustainable economic and social de-
velopment, and other material national interests are relatively 
free from danger and international and domestic threats, and 
the ability to ensure the continuous status of security.245 
 
 238 E.g., Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu Qu Jiduan Hua Tiaoli (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端
化条例) [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the People’s Cong. Of the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region, Oct. 9, 2018) art. 1, translated in Decision to Revise the “Xinjiang Uy-
ghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification”, China Law Translate 中国
法律翻译 (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/关于修改《新疆维吾尔
自治区去极端化条例》的决/?lang=en (noting that, as a local regulation, it is drafted on 
the basis of several national laws including both the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Religious 
Affairs Regulation). 
 239 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fan Kongbu Zhuyi Fa (中华人民共和国反恐怖主义
法) [Anti-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2015) art. 30, translated in Anti-Terrorism 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 36 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China, Westlaw China 万律, (Westlaw China). 
 240 Id. at art. 80(2). 
 241 Id. at art. 80. 
 242 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification, supra note 
238, at art. 9(7). 
 243 Id. at art. 9(8). 
 244 Id. at art. 9(15); see also WORLD UYGHUR CONG., supra note 179, at para. 13 (discuss-
ing the Xinjiang Regulation on De-Extremification in practice). 
 245 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国国家安全法) 
[National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 2015) art. 2, translated in National Security 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 29 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China, Westlaw China 万律, (Westlaw China). 
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By this Article, Chinese law has, at least to an extent, defined national 
security in terms of the extent to which the political regime of the Chinese 
Communist Party is free from domestic threats to its sovereignty over a uni-
fied China.246 
IV. SUPPRESSED IN XINJIANG 
It may be tempting, considering the facts, to take a brief look at the Chinese 
government’s campaign against the Uyghurs, briefly examine the interna-
tional agreements to which China is a party, and quickly conclude that the 
Chinese government is failing to meet its obligations because, in many ways, 
if the Racial Discrimination Convention and the ESCR Covenant prohibit an-
ything, they certainly prohibit mass surveillance, arrest, and internment of an 
ethnic and cultural minority. Nevertheless, a systematic violation of this mag-
nitude warrants an inquiry beyond the text of the international agreements 
themselves, and a further inquiry as to how Chinese law contributes to racial 
and ethnic oppression. 
 
A. A Right to Be Free from Surveillance? 
 
Though the Xinjiang surveillance apparatus is unquestionably the least 
forceful aspect of the Chinese government’s campaign against the Uyghurs, it 
is still discriminatory in a manner prohibited by the Racial Discrimination 
Convention and still violates the cultural rights guaranteed in the ESCR Cov-
enant. These violations are compounded by the fact that Chinese law contrib-
utes to these violations and are made no less important by the absence of overt 
physical force from the surveillance campaign. 
 
i. Xinjiang’s Surveillance System as a Violation of the Racial 
Discrimination Convention 
 
Discussion of the Racial Discrimination Convention thus far has elabo-
rated on two key concepts: the right to be free from racial discrimination and 
the conception of the enumerated rights in Article 5 not as a right to equality 
in their exercise, but as part of a broader framework necessary to eliminate 
racial discrimination under Article 1.247 
Examining the Xinjiang surveillance systems, which combines a massive 
police presence with sophisticated technology, in light of Article 1’s expan-
sive definition of racial discrimination and Article 2’s iteration of the right to 
be free from racial discrimination, it is clear that the use of a mass surveillance 
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system, which targets Uyghurs on the basis of their ethnic origin, constitutes 
a violation of the right to be free from racial discrimination.248 This is partic-
ularly apparent in the home visitation system which specifically targets Uy-
ghur families for additional at-home monitoring.249 The program the govern-
ment calls adoption is quite obviously an act of racial discrimination within 
the scope of Article 2.250 
The government’s use of mass surveillance violates Article 5 in much the 
same way. Conceived of as part of a necessary framework for eliminating ra-
cial discrimination, the Article 5 rights, most notably the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion, function as a right to equal protection from 
religious discrimination when religious discrimination stems from racial dis-
crimination as defined by Article 1.251 Given that the Uyghurs can be seen as 
an ethno-religious minority group,252 religious discrimination against them 
fits within this framework, and is a violation of Article 5. Moreover, the ex-
istence of a surveillance system intended as a method of round-the-clock mon-
itoring can be a barrier to the freedom of conscious that Article 5 is meant to 
protect. The general profiling of Muslims by Xinjiang’s government by re-
quiring them to fill out forms regarding frequency of religious practice, among 
other things,253 therefore breaches this framework. 
 
ii. Xinjiang’s Surveillance System as a Violation of the ESCR 
Covenant 
 
Given the interconnectedness of the right to self-determination and the 
right to participation in cultural life, cultural rights as envisioned in General 
Comment 21 are best applied as two parts of the same whole.254 General Com-
ment 21 takes a very broad interpretation of the cultural rights in the ESCR 
Covenant.255 Critically, the Comment interprets the Convention as embodying 
an obligation to ensure preconditions for participating in cultural life.256 The 
Comment, in turn, interprets cultural life to encompass a broad range of social 
behaviors and activities.257 Given that the surveillance state functions to en-
sure the exact opposite of Uyghur cultural participation, the surveillance state 
can and should be seen as a violation of cultural rights. 
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iii. Applying Chinese Domestic Law 
 
The surveillance state actively violates rights outlined in the Racial Dis-
crimination Convention and the ESCR Covenant.258 That being said, of all 
three aspects of the campaign, mass surveillance is the least controversial un-
der Chinese law. Given the nature and makeup of Chinese legal and political 
system, the use and creation of a surveillance apparatus the size of the one in 
Xinjiang will not require much justification domestically, nor will justifying 
its existence on grounds of a terrorist threat from the Uyghurs. Moreover, be-
cause of the preoccupation with the more fundamentally discriminatory and 
overtly brutal aspects of the other phases of the campaign against the Uyghurs, 
it is unsurprising that the surveillance system, while mentioned briefly,259 has 
not been the center of the committees’, or the international community’s, at-
tention.260 Nevertheless, it should be troubling that in a nation with a stated 
commitment to equal treatment under the law, a discriminatory surveillance 
apparatus has been allowed to do its work. 
 
B. Strike Hard Under International Law 
 
In the second phase of the campaign against the Uyghurs, the Strike Hard 
campaign, any pretense of potential legality under international law should 
begin to fall by the wayside. Strike Hard is historically a discriminatory tactic 
devoted largely to the suppression of cultural dissidents.261 It is clearly illegal 
under both the international agreements and the integral rights implicated in 
Xinjiang. 
 
 
i. Strike Hard Analyzed under the Racial Discrimination Convention 
 
The core premise and motivating force behind Strike Hard is the elimina-
tion of dissidents, and the Uyghurs, who have been motivated by religious 
ideas and the distant memory of self-rule,262 are its natural targets. As such, 
measuring Strike Hard under the Racial Discrimination Convention does not 
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require much analysis. Article 1 poses a wide definition of racial discrimina-
tion and Article 2 poses an interconnected fabric of human rights that serve as 
the framework for compliance with the Convention.263 Strike Hard involves 
conducting raids on the homes of a members of repressed ethnic group be-
cause of their belonging to that group and burning their cultural posses-
sions,264 so strike hard does not comply with China’s obligations under the 
Racial Discrimination Convention. 
It is a titanic understatement to claim that Strike Hard violates the Racial 
Discrimination Convention. Campaigns like strike hard are antithetical to the 
principles that undergird the Racial Discrimination Convention and interna-
tional law generally. The Racial Discrimination Convention is premised on 
the idea that racial minorities should not have to suffer the indignity of une-
qual treatment, much less overt persecution.265 That China has breached its 
obligations so wantonly is further evidence that it does not take them seri-
ously. 
 
ii. Strike Hard Under the ESCR Covenant 
 
The positive nature of the interconnected cultural rights at issue in this 
Note renders them effectively incapable of being met in a situation in which 
strike hard tactics are employed. Strike hard is fundamentally aggressive and 
rooted partially in prejudice. As such, it is largely antithetical to the very idea 
of the sort of positive liberties laid out in the ESCR Covenant. 
If a nation is responsible for ensuring the preconditions necessary for all 
ethnic groups, communities, and individuals to pursue their own cultural ful-
fillment, then that nation cannot be knocking down their doors and burning 
culturally important materials.266 The brazen nature of the Strike Hard cam-
paign further demonstrates the Chinese government’s lack of proper regard 
for international agreements and norms. Even as China has continued this 
campaign, it has publicly claimed that, “special attention is paid to their eco-
nomic development and to their enjoyment of cultural and employment 
rights.”267 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that such a statement is entirely 
contrary to reality in Xinjiang. In light of the strike hard campaign, it is more 
accurate to say that the complete opposite is true. 
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iii. Strike Hard and Chinese Law 
 
Analyzing the Strike Hard campaign under the Racial Discrimination Con-
vention and the ESCR Covenant is an insufficient method of analysis. Under 
either doctrine, the tactics used by strike hard are simply incompatible. Turn-
ing then to Chinese law, the question quickly becomes how it might be possi-
ble under the Chinese Constitution that such policies which specifically target 
Uyghurs,268 as an ethno-religious group, comport with Article 4 of the Chinese 
Constitution.269 This represents a disturbing trend in Chinese law as it pertains 
to Xinjiang. The Chinese government is effectively ignoring portions of its 
law in favor of other areas of the law that are more friendly to its policy ob-
jectives. 
More specifically, the provisions in Chinese Law that supposedly protect 
the civil liberties of Chinese citizens have given way to provisions in its re-
cently amended criminal law as well as the various counter-terrorism stat-
utes.270 The 2015 Amendments to the Criminal Law criminalize numerous 
activities related to “extremism.”271 However, given the Chinese govern-
ment’s almost flagrantly pretextual use of a terrorist threat in Xinjiang to jus-
tify a massive campaign against Uyghur culture, any assertion that these laws 
are meant to do anything besides provide legal cover for the persecution of 
politically thorny ethnic minorities should strain credulity. It would be far 
more accurate to argue that these laws actually contribute to religious perse-
cution in China. By criminalizing behavior associated with extremism, these 
laws effectively amount to a blank check to persecute religious minorities and 
associated dissidents. There is perhaps no greater example of this than the 
Xinjiang Regulation on De-Extremification, which all but expressly targets 
Uyghur culture,272 and is drafted on the basis of the Anti-Terrorism Law.273 
 
C. The Xinjiang Internment Camps 
 
Turning to the Xinjiang internment camps, using the canons of interpreta-
tion focused on thus far in this Note, it is clear that Xinjiang’s internment 
camps depart significantly enough from the obligations in both the Racial Dis-
crimination Convention or the ESCR Covenant to warrant focusing largely on 
 
 268 Chin & Bürge, supra note 86. 
 269 XIANFA art. 4, §1 (2018). 
 270 Compare, e.g., XIANFA art. 36 (2018) (supposedly preserving freedom of religion), 
with Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 230, at art. 120e (crimi-
nalizing dresses or symbols that propagate terrorism or extremism). 
 271 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 230, at arts. 120c, 120d, 
120e. 
 272 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification, supra note 
238, at art. 9. 
 273 Id. at art. 1. 
2019] SILENCING XINJIANG 271 
Chinese domestic law, particularly China’s stated justification under Chinese 
law, namely, fighting off a terrorist threat.274 
As far as international law is concerned, the behavior of the Chinese gov-
ernment in Xinjiang is not merely unlawful under the Racial Discrimination 
Convention or the ESCR Covenant; it runs contrary to the core premises and 
rationale of international law as a whole. This is because, once again, if these 
agreements are to mean anything at all, they must mean that it is unacceptable 
for a national government to engage in vigorous persecution of an ethnic mi-
nority, or to otherwise oppress their culture for the purposes of forced assim-
ilation. 
That being the case, it would be too easy to simply reach such an obvious 
conclusion without digging deeper. Chinese domestic law, while at least nom-
inally offering protection to ethnic minorities,275 is clearly not doing so. The 
nature and structure of Chinese law can shed some light on this quandary. 
China’s definition of national security, for instance, has a considerable 
amount of explanatory power in this regard. The National Security Law artic-
ulates protection of the state’s political regime, unified territorial integrity, 
and the leadership of the Communist Party as three of its primary prerogatives 
in ensuring national security.276 Such a position poses a problem in Xinjiang, 
where many Uyghurs have historically sought self-determination even as the 
Chinese government reasserts its commitment to maintaining its territorial in-
tegrity and sovereignty.277 
China’s definition of national security therefore renders some sort of con-
flict with the Uyghurs inevitable. As discussed previously, the Uyghur people 
are culturally, linguistically, and historically distinct from other nationalities 
in China,278 and given the rhetoric of the Xi administration,279 it may be un-
surprising to see that the Chinese government has, in light of previous violent 
altercations with Uyghur nationalists and separatists, sought to reassert con-
trol over the region.280 In doing so, it has shrouded its actions in a veneer of 
legality under its counter-terrorism framework. While not expressly authoriz-
ing anything resembling the creation of mass internment camps, the Anti-Ter-
rorism Law poses a framework that allows for even persons who have engaged 
in what it classifies as “extremist activities” that do not rise to the level of 
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criminal behavior to receive help and education.281 Local regulations in Xin-
jiang are similarly euphemistic, if not more explicitly anti-Islam and anti-Uy-
ghur.282 
None of this is to say that the Chinese government has legalized these 
camps, or that they are mandated by law.283 Rather, the nature and structure 
of Chinese government at the national and local level render the need for spe-
cific legal authorization largely irrelevant because in the People’s Republic, 
the state and political regime control the law as opposed to being controlled 
by the law.284 This system renders Messrs. Xi and Chen unbound by any legal 
framework that might foreseeably force them to end the campaign. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The situation in Xinjiang tends to call to mind dystopian images and bleak 
skies. This might be a fair appraisal if one examined only the facts. In exam-
ining the situation internationally, there is some solace to be taken in under-
standing the rights nations obligate themselves to under international agree-
ments do not allow someone to be imprisoned for indoctrination. Conversely, 
there is little reason to believe that international legal frameworks will restrain 
the Chinese government going forward. Chinese domestic law offers little 
hope of salvation for Xinjiang. As new, horrific allegations285 seep forward 
from Xinjiang’s re-education camps, it seems more international awareness 
may be coming even as the clocks have already struck thirteen in Urumqi. 
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